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Non-technical summary
The theory of compensating differentials states that higher risk of unemployment or
uncertain prospects in general are compensated by higher wages. If workers with
fixed-term contracts (FTCs) are bearing a higher risk they may obtain higher wages.
On the other hand the theory of dual labour markets specifies conditions under which
temporary workers earn less than permanent workers even if they have the same
productivity.
Until now there does not exist any German empirical study which investigates the
wage effects of FTCs and takes into account the selection bias. Since the selection into
permanent or temporary contracts is not random, it is important to account for the
selection mechanism in order to estimate unbiased effects of FTCs on wages.
Furthermore, the ‘classical’ selection problem due to the fact that wages can only be
observed for those persons who participate in the labour market has to be considered. 
Another intention of the paper is to compare propensity score matching estimators
with parametric approaches. Matching estimators, which are usually applied for the
evaluation of active labour market policies, turn out to be well suited, since they allow
to include variables in the balancing score, which are endogenous with regard to the
type of contract. The estimation results differ between the methods. Small negative
effects of FTCs which are not statistically significant are found with matching, while
the effects estimated by the parametric approach are unrealistically large. Another
interesting result of this study is that important characteristics of the workers like
human capital or sex do not determine the probability of FTCs. The workers’
individual (un-)employment histories seem to be more important. 
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Abstract
The wage effects of fixed-term contracts (FTCs) are analysed with
the GSOEP for West Germany. Different estimators which take
into account selection bias are used. It is shown that propensity
score matching estimators which are usually applied for the
evaluation of active labour market programmes are well-suited for
the analysis of this topic, whereas parametric approaches find unre-
alistically large negative effects. The empirical evidence rejects
compensating wage differentials as well as strong negative wage
effects of FTCs.  
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11 Introduction
Fixed-term contracts (FTCs) define temporary employment relationships, which
expire automatically without dismissal at the end of the agreed term.1 Therefore it
seems to be plausible to expect FTC workers to bear a higher risk of unemploy-
ment and discontinuity than permanent workers. 
Which effect do FTCs have on individual wages? The well-known theory of
compensating differentials states that disadvantages among work activities are
equalised by wage differentials (Rosen 1986). Higher risk of unemployment or
general uncertain prospects of the future working life due to an FTC may be com-
pensated by a higher wage. For example, a worker with an FTC may receive a
higher wage that equalizes the loss of the expected value of the redundancy pay.
On the other hand there are also reasons for negative effects of FTCs on wages.
For example, the dual labour market theory predicts that workers with higher
turnover are paid less. Temporary contracts may also serve as a prolongation of
the probationary period. In this case low-paid FTC jobs may be a kind of sorting
mechanism: only workers with high productivity will accept temporary contracts
since they have a higher probability of getting a permanent position with higher
wages afterwards. 
While available studies find some evidence for compensating wage differentials
for jobs with higher unemployment risk in the U.S. (see Rosen 1986), so far only
negative effects on wages have been found for temporary contracts. Booth et al.
(2000) find that FTC workers in Britain earn less than permanent workers (men
8.9% and women 6%). However, for some workers FTCs seem to be a stepping
stone for a permanent job, i.e. there is some compensation in the long-run. 
Although there are some German empirical studies available which investigate
the wage differentials between FTC and permanent workers they ignore potential
selection bias (see for example Schömann / Kruppe 1994; Groß 1999). Since the
selection into permanent or temporary contracts is not random it is important to
account for the selection mechanism in order to estimate unbiased effects of FTCs
on wages. Furthermore, the classical selection problem due to the fact that wages
can only be observed for those persons who participate in the labour market
should be considered (Heckman 1979). To my knowledge, this paper is the first
empirical attempt to examine the effect of FTCs on wages taking the selection bias
into account. Therefore, I do not analyse whether FTCs are associated with higher
or lower wages but whether the effect of FTCs are higher or lower wages.    
Another intention of the paper is to compare matching estimators with traditional
parametric techniques. Matching Estimators, which are usually applied for the
evaluation of active labour market policies, turn out to be well suited, since they
allow to include variables in the balancing score, which are endogenous with re
                                             
1 See Schömann et al. (1995) and Boockmann / Hagen (2001) for a further description of the institu-
tional background in Germany
2gard to the type of contract. The estimation results differ between the methods.
With propensity score matching small negative effects of FTCs, which are not
statistically significant, are found, while the effects estimated by traditional
maximum likelihood models are unrealistically large. Another interesting result of
this study is that important characteristics of the workers like human capital or sex
do not determine the probability of FTCs. The workers individual (un-)em-
ployment histories seem to be more important. 
2 Theoretical Considerations
This section provides theoretical explanations for wage effects of temporary
contracts and discusses reasons why workers enter FTCs.  
2.1 Wage effects
A worker with an FTC will  in a competitive labour market with mobility be-
tween jobs and perfect information  receive a higher wage that just offsets the
loss of the expected value of the redundancy pay (Booth et al. 2000). The com-
pensating differential depends on the probability that the worker receives a per-
manent contract afterwards, the workers attitude towards risk, the unemployment
insurance and the formation of expectations (see Abowd / Ashenfelter 1981; Topel
1984). Also firms may be willing to pay temporary workers the present value of
the expected institutional firing costs which would be incurred if these workers
had a permanent contract. However, there are a number of reasons why temporary
workers may not receive a compensating differential in the form of higher wages
than permanent workers. 
 The dual labour markets theory derives conditions under which the wages for
temporary workers may be lower even if temporary and permanent workers are
perfect substitutes. In the tradition of the Shapiro / Stiglitz (1984) efficiency
wage models, Rebitzer / Taylor (1991) show, by assuming that the monitoring
of the workers is costly and the product demand is uncertain, that wages paid to
permanent workers exceed those paid to temporary workers.2 
 FTC workers and their employers have lower incentives to invest in firm-
specific human capital which leads to lower wages (and probably also other
long-term negative prospects). In contrast to the formal qualification like
schooling and apprenticeship, the effective investment in firm-specific human
capital can be observed only incompletely in most data sources, so it might be
difficult to distinguish between the direct effect of  temporary employment and
the indirect effect via the lack of investment in human capital. 
                                             
2 Daniel  / Sofer (1998) combine the dual labour market theory with the theory of compensating wage
differentials. They find empirical evidence for compensating differentials in low unionized sectors.
3 Firms view the initial temporary contract as a probationary stage. Depending on
the job performance and labour demand, workers will move into permanent
employment within the firm. Low-paid temporary jobs can even be attractive to
workers with high ability. As pointed out by Loh (1994) probationary periods
(with lower wages) may induce self-selection of those workers with higher
ability because they have a higher probability of getting permanent contracts.
Temporary contracts with lower wages are therefore a sorting instrument for
firms. Low wages during the temporary contract period will be compensated for
by higher future wages at the same employer.   
 Temporary workers may be outsiders since their bargaining position is weak-
ened due to the lack of institutional firing costs. 
2.2 Why do workers accept job offers with temporary contracts?
Assuming that temporary workers are not contemporaneously compensated by
higher wages and that they might therefore be worse off, the question arises why
workers accept job offers with temporary contracts.3 
A first explanation is that particular jobs are only available with temporary con-
tracts. For example flexible schedules or part-time jobs in order to meet family,
school or other non-work responsibilities may be only available as temporary jobs.
Regional immobility may force persons to accept FTCs even if they would get
permanent contracts in other regions. In Germany many academic positions, espe-
cially for young people, are only available in combination with FTCs. Persons
may accept job offers with FTCs to meet temporary declines in family income,
particularly when other family members may be laid off. Those reasons for in-
voluntary temporary contracts are obviously more decisive in economic down-
turns. 
Additional explanations are possible if one assumes asymmetric information, i.e.
important characteristics of the worker are unobservable for the employer. A tem-
porary contract may be a kind of prolonged probationary period which allows
firms to obtain information that is unavailable before hiring and that serves as a
check on the quality of the match between workers and job. As already mentioned,
this may induce a positive selection. The model of Loh (1994) predicts that in a
competitive market setting, workers with greater ability (which is unobservable
before hiring) migrate to firms offering jobs with probationary period, and those
with lower ability migrate to firms offering jobs with no probationary period,
since the formers face lower risks of losing the job. 
 If employers are uncertain about the unobservable characteristics of the em-
ployees, the individuals employment history may serve as signal. References
from previous employers but also the reputation of previous employers may in-
clude information on the unobservable characteristics of the worker. If the previ
                                             
3 Firms reason of employing temporary workers are analysed in Boockmann / Hagen (2001).  
4ous employment history involves bad signals and there are no alternative appli-
cants available the employer will hire the worker on a temporary contract. Impor-
tant signals may be labour market experience and the duration of previous em-
ployment or unemployment spells.  
These considerations are compatible with empirical evidence from the German
Microcensus for 1997 (see Hagen 2001). Workers are questioned about the rea-
sons for being employed with an FTC. 20.7% of all FTC workers are in the pro-
bationary period, 19.1% cannot find a permanent job, 5.0% do not want a perma-
nent job and 55.3% have other reasons.4 
  
3 Methodological Issues
Which effect do FTCs have on wages? This question can be restated: How much
would workers with permanent contracts earn if they had FTCs instead?  In order
to answer these questions one can apply methods which are used for the evalua-
tion of active labour market programs (for a survey see Heckman et al. 1999;
Hagen / Steiner 2000). 
3.1 The Evaluation Problem
What is the causal effect of a treatment 1 (an FTC), relative to another treatment
0 (permanent contract), on the outcome variable Y ? 
Let Y1 be the outcome (hourly wage) that would result if the individual was ex-
posed to treatment 1 (FTC) and Y0 the outcome that would result if the same indi-
vidual received no treatment (permanent contract).  0,1C is a  dummy variable
indicating if the treatment is actually received. The outcome Y may be employ-
ment, employment stability, satisfaction, state of health or wages, for example.
For an individual i, the actually observed outcome is therefore
 0 1 0i i i i iY Y C Y Y   . 
The parameter of interest is the average effect of the treatment, which is given
by 
     1 0 1 0| 1 | 1 | 1E Y Y C E Y C E Y C      .         (1)
This measures the change in the outcome of the participants which is caused by
the fact that they participate ( 1C  ). The last term in (1) describes the hypotheti-
cal average outcome if the participants had not participated. Of course, this term
                                             
4 Without the public sector and employees in vocational training. There are interesting differences be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers: While 24.2% of all unskilled FTC workers have their temporary
contract due to the probationary period only 14.5% of the skilled FTC workers are in the probationary
period (see Hagen 2001).
5is not observable and has to be estimated either by a before-after comparison using
only participants or a control group of non-participants or a combination of both.
In this paper only a control group of non-participants is generated. However, the
average value of the outcome of the non-participants typically does not represent
the correct average of non-treatment outcome since participants and non-
participants differ in characteristics which influence the outcome variable,
   0 0| 1 | 0E Y C E Y C   .        (2)
Equation (2) states that using non-participants as an estimate for the hypothetical
situation a participant had not participated is in general not valid, since both
groups differ due to observable and unobservable characteristics giving rise to a
selection bias. The treated individuals are not a random sample of the population,
but they may select themselves or may be selected on the basis of characteristics
which also influence their outcome. The following sections shows how matching
(section 3.2) and parametric approaches (section 3.3) deal with this problem. 
3.2 Statistical Matching 
Let Z  be a vector that describes observable attributes of the individuals which
are not affected by the treatment, like sex and age. The statistical matching esti-
mator may solve the problem of selection bias (due to differences in observable
characteristics) by imposing the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA)
 0 1,Y Y C Z        (3)
where   denotes independence. This assumption justifies the use of matched non-
participants (workers with permanent contracts) to measure what participants
(workers with FTC) would earn, on average, if they had not participated (had a
permanent contract). Obviously, the vector Z should contain all the variables that
are thought to simultaneously influence participation and  outcome. If this condi-
tion is fulfilled one can assume 
   0 0| 1, | 0,E Y C Z E Y C Z   .        (4)
By using this expression it is possible to estimate consistently the average treat-
ment effect expressed in equation (1). 
Especially if the vector Z is large and contains many continuous variables it may
become very unlikely to find for every combination of Z a match between all per-
sons of the treatment with a person of the non-treatment group (curse of dimen-
sionality; Heckman et al. 1997). 
6However, as Rosenbaum / Rubin (1983) show it is sufficient to match partici-
pants and non-participants on the conditional probability of participation given the
vector of observed characteristics. This conditional probability of participation
   Pr 1e Z C Z   is called propensity score. By definition treatment and non-
treatment observations with the same value of the propensity score have the same
distribution of the full vector of Z . So (4) can be written as
     0 0| 1, | 0,E Y C e Z E Y C e Z                     (5)
The propensity score  e Z  can be estimated by standard parametric approaches
like the probit or logit model (Dehejia / Wahba 1999). In this paper it is estimated
by probit.  
Since any transformation of the propensity score which preserves the order of
the observations is sufficient for the matching estimator, the predicted linear index
Z  rather than the predicted probability  Pr 1C Z  is used (see Lechner 1998,
115). Thereby individuals in the tails of the distribution can be distinguished more
exactly.  Nevertheless, in the following I will also use the term propensity score
for the linear index Z .  
Implementation of the propensity score matching estimators
For each person i in the treatment group, a (group of) comparable persons is
found. Matches are constructed on the basis of a neighbourhood  ie , where ie
is the propensity score for person i. It is assumed that 0N  is the number of obser-
vations in the comparison sample and 1N  is the number of observations in the
treatment sample. Thus the persons in the comparison sample who are neighbours
to i, are persons j for whom  j ie e , i.e. the set of persons   i j jA j e e  . 
The effect of treatment for each observation i in the treatment group is estimated
by subtracting the weighted average of the outcome of control group observations
from the outcome of the treatment observation i (see Heckman et al. 1999, 1953):
 
0
1 0
1
,
N
i j
j
Y w i j Y

        (6)
Matching estimators differ especially in the weights    , 0,1w i j   with
 
0
1
, 1
N
j
w i j

  for the members of the comparison group. 
7Nearest-neighbours matching
Nearest-neighbours matching defines iA  such that only the control j is selected
that is closest to ie  in some metric:
  01,..., mini i jj NA j e e  ,        (7)
where  is a metric measuring the distance in the Z . Equation (7) states that the
non-participant with the value of je  that is nearest to ie  is selected as a match and
is defined as a control. This selected non-participant is attached with the weight
 ,w i j =1. 
Nearest-neighbours matching can be executed with or without replacement. With
replacement means that the non-treated individuals can be used more than once.
This can improve the matching quality, but it increases the related standard error
of the estimated effect. Therefore, the standard errors have to be adjusted (Sianesi
2001). It is also possible to use more than one nearest neighbour (oversampling).
Nearest-neighbours matching has generally the disadvantage that bad matches
are likely if the closest neighbour is far away.
Caliper matching
Caliper matching  a version of nearest-neighbours matching  may reduce the
risk of bad matches (see Cochran / Rubin 1973). For a pre-specified level of tol-
erance 0  , the treated individual i is matched to the non-treated unit j such that:
i je e   .        (8)
The corresponding neighbourhood is    i j i jA X e e  .
If none of the non-treated units is within the   of th treated individual i, the indi-
vidual i is left unmatched and is not used for the estimation. This leads to a modi-
fied sample, since treated persons are left out. Therefore, the estimated effect
should be interpreted only on the basis of the sample used.  
Mahalanobis Metric Matching
Using additional variables (a subset of variables included in Z and assumed to be
important) separately besides the propensity score may decrease the selection bias
and may be an additional protection against any impact due to inconsistent esti-
mation of the propensity score (Lechner 1998). The propensity score in combina-
tion with the additional variables is called balancing score  b Z  (Rosenbaum /
8Rubin 1983). The matching on the balancing score is performed by the Mahalano-
bis distance (see Rubin 1980; Lechner 1998):
   1i j i j i jb b b b b b

      ,        (9)
where ib  and jb  are the balancing scores and  is the covariance matrix formed
from the 1C   sample.  
Advantages of Matching
What are the advantages of matching estimators over parametric estimators? A
basic requirement for a bias-removing implementation of the matching algorithm
is a sufficiently large overlap between the distribution of the propensity scores of
the treated and non-treated persons. This is called the common support condition
and means that for every treated person a sufficient similar non-treated person is
available.5 The condition ensures that one does not compare the incomparable
(Heckman et al. 1997, 647). This condition is always met in social experiments.
As stressed by Heckman et al. (1997) an unbiased application of matching meth-
ods is only possible inside the range of common support of the distribution of Z
of the treatment and non-treatment group.6 The common support condition is es-
sential for the matching estimator but not for traditional parametric techniques.
Parametric approaches can be used to predict the expected outcome even in re-
gions of the variable space where no observation can occur (Lechner 2000). This
fact is assessed as an advantage of matching.
The most obvious advantages of matching estimators in comparison to other
methods is that it is a non-parametric technique which avoids the definition of a
specific form for the outcome equation and the selection equation and which does
not require to assume any specification of unobservables in both equations. This
also means that variables on which the matching is performed directly may be en-
dogenous with regard to the participation decision. In the empirical application of
this paper the duration of the actual employment (job tenure) is an endogenous
variable in a probit estimation for the probability of being employed with an FTC.
Therefore in section 6.4 matching is performed directly on this variable (besides
the propensity score) and job tenure is omitted form the propensity score estima-
tion. 
However, because of the parametrical estimation of the propensity score (with
probit or logit) these advantages are reduced in practise. The whole estimation
                                             
5 More formally this means 0 < Pr(C=1 | Z) < 1.
6 According to Heckman et al. (1999) there are in general three possible sources of  selection bias. The
first one is the difference in the support of Z in the treated and control group, the second bias appears
due to the difference between the two groups of the distribution of Z over its common support and the
reason for the third bias is selection on unobservables.  
9becomes inconsistent if there are any specification errors in the selection equation.
Even so, propensity score matching has still the advantage not to impose any
functional forms and not to rely on any distributional assumptions in the outcome
equation. This also means that heterogeneous individual treatment effects are al-
lowed, i.e. the functional form of the effect is not assumed to be a constant addi-
tive term  for every individual like in the parametric model which is presented in
the next section. 
3.3 Control Function Estimator 
The so called control function approach motivated by Heckman (1978, 1979) is
a full maximum likelihood estimator which evaluates the effect of an endoge-
nously chosen dummy variable (indicating any treatment like training, union
membership or temporary contract) on another endogenous continuous  variable,
conditional on two sets of independent variables. 
The primary equation is 
'i i i iY x C              (10)
 
where iC  is the binary variable indicating whether the individual i belongs to the
treatment group (have an FTC; iC = 1) or belongs to the control group (have a
permanent contract; iC = 0). iC  is assumed to be derived from an unobservable
latent variable
*
i i iC Z u  .         (11)
The decision to be in the treatment group (to have an FTC) is determined by the
rule
 
*1,   if 0
0,  otherwise
i
i
CC   

     (12)
where the error terms   and u are bivariate normally distributed with mean zero
and correlation  .
The expected outcome for the treatment group can be written as 
   | 1 ' | 1i i i i iE Y C x E C             (13)
          ' i ix Z        ,
where 

  is the standard deviation of   and   is the hazard (see Maddala 1983).
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For non-participants the counterpart to equation (13) is
 
 
 
| 0 '
1
i
i i i
i
Z
E Y C x
Z
 
 

 
    
	 

,                 (14)
where   is the standard normal density, and   is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. The difference in expected outcome between participants
and non-participants is,
   
 
    
| 1 | 0
1
i
i i i i
i i
Z
E Y C E y C
Z Z
 
 
 
 
      
  	 

.      (15)
It can be seen that if the selection correction is omitted like in OLS regressions
which treat the type of contract as exogenous, the second term on the right-hand
side drops out. If the correlation between the error terms,  , is zero, there is no
selection bias (the effect can be estimated by OLS) and the difference is simply  . 
Although this model seems to have the advantage to be logically specified since
it can be derived as a structural approach it has been criticised for some of its as-
sumptions which are crucial for identification. One needs at least one w  variable
in the selection equation (11) which is not included in the x  variables of the out-
come equation (10).7  Furthermore,  the models consistency is based on the joint
normal distribution of   and u  which is arbitrary. Another critical point is that the
endogenous dummy variable is assumed to be a shift-parameter in a given out-
come function. Therefore, it is assumed that the functional form of the outcome
equation is the same for the participants and non-participants and that the treat-
ment  (the contract) has a linear effect.8   
3.4 Probit Model with Sample Selection
In order to estimate the effect of FTCs on wages consistently it may be necessary
to take another source of selection bias into account: The decision whether to have
a permanent or an FTC job can only be observed for those individuals who par-
ticipate in the labour market. Therefore, the estimation of the determinants of
FTCs may be biased if unobserved characteristics influencing the participation in
the labour market are the same as those affecting the selecting into FTCs. 
                                             
7 In theory the model can still be estimated in the absence of exclusion restrictions through identification
by functional form (Fitzenberger / Prey 1998). However, identification of the model then rests entirely
on the assumptions on the joint distribution of the error terms.  
8 An extension of this model which allows different outcome functions for the participants and the non-
participants is the endogenous swichting model. An comparable approach  which produces generally
similar estimates  is one with instrumental variables (see Vella / Verbeek 1999). 
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To check the significance of this problem, a maximum-likelihood probit model
with sample selection  similar to that proposed by Heckman (1979) for continu-
ous variables  is estimated (see Van de Ven / Van Pragg 1981). In addition to the
probit estimation for the FTCs a selection equation for participation in the labour
market is simultaneously estimated. The error terms of both equations are as-
sumed to be normally distributed. If the correlation of the error terms   is not
zero a separate estimation of the probit for FTCs leads to biased results. This is
checked by performing a likelihood-ratio test comparing the likelihood of the full
model (the simultaneous estimation of the probit and the participation equation)
with the sum of the likelihoods for the separate estimated probit and participation
model. Similar to the model described in the last section for identification, one
variable in the participation equation is needed which is not included in the probit
estimation.
4 Dataset: The German Socio-Economic Panel 
The analysis is mainly based on the wave 1999 of the German Socio-Economic-
Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a representative household survey of the German
population, conducted on a yearly basis.9 It contains information about the kind of
labour contract (fixed-term vs. permanent) and whether the FTC is due to public
employment measure. The latter persons are excluded from the analysis. Besides,
in order to restrict the heterogeneity, only those persons who are working in West-
Germany and have the German citizenship are used. Self-employed, military ser-
vants and those who are on an apprenticeship training are removed from the sam-
ple. Furthermore, the sample is restricted to persons not younger than 30 years and
not older than 60 years to secure that the labour force participation is sufficiently
large.  
Since average hours worked differ slightly between FTC and permanent con-
tracts, hourly wages rather than (monthly) earnings are analysed. Hourly wages
are calculated from the information on individual gross earnings and actually
worked hours in the previous month. Fringe benefits like 13th month pay, holiday
or Christmas bonuses are not taken into account because this information cannot
consistently be combined with the information on hourly wages (Steiner / Wagner
1997). 
A very useful feature of the GSOEP is the availability of monthly information
between yearly interviews. Different employment and income states are covered.
This information is collected by retrospective questions about what happened in
particular months of the previous year. From these data the duration of the previ-
ous employment spell as well as the previous unemployment spell are generated. I
                                             
9 Details on the GSOEP can be obtained from the web-server of the German Institute of Economic Re-
search (DIW) in Berlin (http://www.diw-berlin.de/soep/).
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use only the last employment or unemployment spell which ended within the pre-
vious two years. 
5 Determinants of FTCs
In this section the determinants of FTCs are analysed by estimating a probit
model. This is used in the subsequent sections as a propensity score or for the
control function estimation, respectively. Besides the usual characteristics like
gender, age, marital status, children, human capital and profession, variables con-
trolling for the employment history are included.
Unfortunately there are not enough observations available to perform the analy-
sis of wage effects for men and women separately. However, gender differences
are considered in the propensity score and the selection equation of the control
function approach estimation by including interaction terms of important variables
with the women dummy. Besides, as the following results show, gender seems to
have no important impact on the probability of being employed with an FTC. 
As already mentioned, previous unemployment and employment spells may in-
clude important unobserved variables like ability or motivation (see Heckman
et al. 1997 in the context of labour market training). Furthermore, these variables
may be signals for employers. In order to capture these effects the duration of the
previous unemployment spell and the duration of the previous employment, which
ended within the last two years, are included in the selection equation. Further-
more, a dummy variable indicating if a person has never had a job before or has
been out of labour force before and a dummy variable for a change of employer
within the previous two years are included.  
An important variable which may represent the probationary period is the dura-
tion of the actual employment. However, this variable is obviously endogenous,
since the duration of a FTC is ceteris paribus shorter than the duration of a perma-
nent contract. For this reason, the variable is omitted from the probit regression
and is included directly in the balancing score of the matching estimator and the
outcome equation of the parametric approach instead.
 The probit model is augmented by a sample selection equation for the labour
market participation. The labour market participation equation includes human
capital variables, gender, the number of children, age, the employment status of
the spouse, dummy variables indicating the attitude to work and a dummy variable
indicating whether the person has to pay interest payments. Additionally there are
interaction terms with the female dummy included. Descriptive statistics for all
the variables can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. 
The estimation results can be seen in Table 1. Especially the results for the for-
mal qualification are unexpected. The coefficients are insignificant and joint tests
also show that formal qualification does not affect the probability of FTCs. The
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results for the dummy variables indicating blue collar workers and professionals10
support the conjecture that FTC employees are very heterogeneous. Both variables
have a positive impact.
The individual employment history seems to be very important: The longer the
previous unemployment spell the higher is the probability of an FTC, and the
longer the previous employment spell (at one employer) the lower the probability
of an FTC. More than one explanation seems to be suitable for this result. Short
previous employment spells may be a proxy for previous FTCs. If this was true
there would be a kind of state dependence which would reject a stepping stone
theory. The individual (un-)employment history may also capture characteristics
like ability or motivation which cannot be observed in the data directly. This
would mean that persons with higher ability have longer (shorter) employment
(unemployment) spells and a lower probability of being employed with an FTC. A
further explanation suggests that employers hesitate to hire workers with an unsta-
ble labour market history on a permanent position since they suppose that these
workers have only low ability, given the observable characteristics like qualifica-
tion and age.11 Compatible with this explanation are the results for the dummy
variables indicating if the person has changed his or her employer or entered new
employment after having been out of labour force within in the previous year. The
highly significant results of these dummy variables can also be explained by the
probationary period, which has always been a legally accepted reason for the use
of FTCs.
Although the estimated positive effect of the dummy variable for women is not
significant at 10 percent level there is some (also insignificant) evidence that ex-
perience lowers the probability of FTCs for women, but not for men. The prob-
ability of civil servants to be employed with an FTC decreases significantly with
their experience. The three variables for experience (the experience variable and
the interaction with women and civil servants) are significant at 1 per cent in a
joint likelihood-ratio test. One may conclude that labour market experience serves
as a positive signal for civil servants (with regard to their unobservables), which
increases their probability of being employed with a permanent contract. There are
also some differences between different firm sizes. Workers in firms with 200 to
1999 employees seem to have the highest probability for FTCs. 
                                             
10 Professionals correspond with the International Standard Classification of Occupation from the Inter-
national Labour Office in Geneva and include physical, mathematical and engineering science profes-
sionals, life science and health professionals, teaching professionals, business, legal and social science
professionals as well as writers and artists.  
11 This result is also compatible with the result of Farber (1999) for the U.S., who finds that job losers are
significantly more likely than non-losers to be employed in temporary jobs. However, in this analysis
dummy variables indicating whether the worker was dismissed from the last job or quit the last job
voluntarily have no significant effect.
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Table 1: Determinants of FTCs taking participation decision into account
FTC Labour market participation
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat.
Constant -2.193 -5,71 Constant -6.055 -5.20
Women 0.512 1.35 Women 1.765 1.14
qualification 
(Reference: No formal qualifica-
tion and low school degree)
Qualification 
(Reference: No formal qualifi-
cation and low school degree)
Intermediate school degree 0.066 0.47 Intermediate school degree -0.185 -2.19
High school 0.082 0.39 High school -0.101 -0.73
Apprenticeship -0.126 -0.83 Apprenticeship -0.084 -0.82
Graduate -0.149 0.224 Graduate 0.779 4.84
Intermediate school    women 0.009 2.44
Dur. of previous unemployment 0.024 2.56 High school   women 0.016 2.14
Dur. of previous employment -0.004 -3.50 Apprenticeship   women 0.003 0.74
Experience 0.000 0.02 Graduate   women -0.020 -2.32
Blue collar worker 0.315 2.17 Attitude to work 
Professionals 0.280 0.163 Work is very important 0.165 3.07
Civil service 0.874 2.27 Work is unimportant -0.850 -10.85
Experience   civil service -0.029 -1.90 Interest payments 0.340 3.28
Experience   women -0.018 -1.26 Spouse employed 0.089 1.07
New employer 1.171 7.39 Spouse employed   women 0.152 1.33
Out of labour force before 0.804 3.55 # of children -0.031 -0.65
# of children   women -0.338 -5.31
Firm size Married 0.448 3.38
(Reference: 1-19 employees) Married   women -0.930 -4.87
Firm size   20    199 0.266 1.71 Divorced -0.282 -1.61
Firm size 200  1999   0.450 2.65 Divorced   women 0.220 0.95
Firm size 2000   0.061 0.18 Age 0.350 6.68
Age2 -0.004 -7.74
Age   women -0.103 -1.49
Age2   women 0.001 1.79
LR  tests of Joint Significance χ2 P-val. LR  tests of Joint Significance χ2 P-val.
Experience 9.83 0.021 Attitude to work 153.96 0.000
Firm size 2.39 0.496 # of children 77.60 0.000
Qualification 70.20 0.000
Age 229.27 0.000
Divorced 2.76 0.252
Spouse employed 10.71 0.005
Number of uncensored observations: 2,114 Number of observations: 3,501
Log-Likelihood 2109.258 
Wald test : χ2 (20) = 136.69 (p-value: 0.000) 
  = 0.03 (Std. Err.: 0.206)
LR test of independence of the equations (  =0) : χ2 (1) = 0.19 (p-value: 0.6650)
Notes: The joint tests include all interaction terms. 
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel
A number of other variables like income of the spouse, marital status, number of
children, distance between job and place of residence and regional unemployment
rate were included in the equation for FTC and turned out to be insignificant.12
                                             
12 The distance between the job and the place of residence may be a proxy for a utility increasing or de-
creasing attribute of a job. A utility gain of a job which is near the place of residence may be traded-off
15
Finally, an important finding for the further analysis is the result of the likeli-
hood-ratio test of the independence of the equations (and therefore the signifi-
cance of the correlation of the disturbances  ). Since the null hypothesis of no
correlation is not rejected, the estimated probit for FTCs is not significantly differ-
ent from the outcome which would be obtained by estimating a probit for FTCs
not taking into account the participation decision. Therefore, one can conclude
that it is not inconsistent to estimate the determinants of FTCs separately.  
Table 2: Determinants of FTCs
Coeff. t-stat
Constant -2.041 -7.44
Dur. of previous unemployment 0.023 2.49
Dur. of previous employment -0.004 -3.66
Experience -0.007 -0.74
Blue collar worker 0.319 2.36
Professionals 0.277 1.85
Civil service 0.952 2.50
Experience   civil service -0.031 -2.08
Experience   women 0.003 0.56
New employer 1.167 7.42
Out of labour force before 0.839 3.74
Firm size
(Basis: 1-19 employees)
Firm size   20    199 0.255 1.66
Firm size 200  1999   0.445 2.65
Firm size 2000   0.011 0.03
LR  tests of Joint Significance χ2 P-val.
Experience 8.35 0.040
Firm size 7.49 0.058
Log-Likelihood 696.198 
Wald test : χ2 (28) = 1585.57 (p-value: 0.000) 
Number of Observations: 1,914
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel
The separate probit estimation for FTCs, which will be used for the further
analysis, is depicted in Table 2. The groups of variables which are in joint tests
insignificant in the probit with sample selection are excluded. Again, several ad-
ditional variables were tested but they were all insignificant. As expected, the re-
sults are only slightly altered in comparison to the probit model with sample se-
lection in Table 1. 
                                                                                                                                     
against the utility loss of a temporary contract. The regional unemployment rate is a proxy for aggre-
gate labour demand. Low labour demand may force workers to enter FTCs. 
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6 Wage Effects of FTCs
6.1 Empirical Wage Equation
For the parametric estimation of the wage effects of FTCs one has to specify an
outcome equation. For this purpose a standard Mincer equation which is aug-
mented by a dummy variable for FTCs and interaction terms is used:13
 2 '0 1 2 3 4
2
5 6 7 8
+
       +
       
i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
y SKILL EXP EXP SKILL EXP
FEM FEM EXP TEN TEN Z C
    
     
    
              (16)
where iy  = natural log of gross hourly wages of individual i
SKILL = vector of educational and vocational dummy variables
EXP = labour market experience (years)
2EXP = labour market experience (years) squared
FEM = dummy for women
TEN = job tenure (months)
2TEN = job tenure (months) squared 
Z = vector of firm size and industry dummies
C = dummy for fixed-term contracts
 = error term with  20,i N  ,   0E X   
   and X = all explanatory variables.
Several additional variables and interaction terms were checked. But they turned
out to be insignificant.14  
The skill structure is captured by dummy variables for the educational and voca-
tional qualification and years of labour market experience. After performing sev-
eral likelihood-ratio tests, the following skill dummy variables are used. (1) no
vocational training and low school degree (reference category), (2) no vocational
training and intermediate school degree, (3) no vocational training and high
school, (4) vocational training or master craftsman and (5) polytechnical or uni-
versity degree. As usual, labour market experience is defined as age  years of
schooling  6, where years of schooling are derived from information on the high-
est educational and vocational degree (see Rosen 1992).15 
                                             
13 For further explanations of this equation see Franz (1999) and Card (1999). 
14 For example regional dummies and interactions between civil servants and labour market experience
were checked.
15 The years of schooling are assumed to be as follows. Without any educational degree 7 years, low
school degree (Hauptschule) 9 years, intermediate school degree (Realschule) 10 years, qualification
for studies at a polytechnic (Fachhochschulreife) 12 years, high school (Abitur) 13 years, apprentice-
ship (Lehre) 1,5 years,  polytechnic (Fachhochschule) 3 years, university 5 years.
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Labour market experience is viewed as a proxy for human capital accumulation
through training and learning on the job. Since a hypothesis of the human capital
theory states that earnings increase with experience with a decreasing rate, one
should estimate 2 >0 and 3 <0 (see Lauer / Steiner 2000).  Interaction terms
between educational and vocational qualification reflect that experience effects
may depend on the skill-level. For the interaction term between woman and expe-
rience it is expected that 6 <0 (see Mincer / Polachek 1974). 
Additionally, the duration of the actual employment relationship with the em-
ployer (job tenure) is included. This may  more than labour market experience 
capture the effects of the accumulation of firm-specific human capital (Topel
1991), and, more important, the effects of (formal and informal) probationary pe-
riods. As already mentioned it is not possible to include this variable in the probit
model for FTCs. By including job tenure in the wage equation directly, the bias
due to the omission of this variable from the probit equation may  be reduced.
Again, it is plausible to expect 7 >0 and 8 <0. 
6.2 Estimating the wage effects of FTCs treating the type of contract
as exogenous 
In this section a simple OLS Regression treating the contract as exogenous is
performed. The estimation results are presented in Table 3. Descriptive statistics
for the variables can be found in Table A2 in the appendix. The main finding is
that FTCs have significant negative effects on wages. FTC workers earn about
9.97 percent less per hour than workers with FTCs.16 The results for human capi-
tal and experience are comparable with those found in other studies for Germany
(see Steiner / Lauer 2000). 
However, the results may not only be biased due to the endogeneity of  the type
of contract but also due to the classical sample selection bias (Heckman 1979).
This may occur for the same reason as described in section 3.4 for the choice of
the type of contract: The wage is only observed for those persons who participate
in the labour force. It is likely that the error terms of the labour market participa-
tion equation and the wage equation are correlated. If so, the sample of individuals
observed as working do not represent the underlying population. If the selection
bias is not recognised, the estimation of the parameters in the wage equation (and
also the estimated effect of FTCs) are inconsistent.
                                             
16 -9.97 = [(exp(-0.105)-1)100]. 
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Table 3: Wage effects of FTCs
Coeff. t-stat
Constant 2.717 20.73
Women -0.001 -0.03
Qualification 
(reference: No formal qualification and low school degree)
Intermediate school degree -0.093 -1.43
High school 0.101 1.04
Apprenticeship -0.037 -0.57
Graduate 0.219 2.39
Experience / 100 1.270 1.70
Experience² / 100 -0.026 -2.39
Experience / 100   women -0.590 -3.32
Experience / 100    intermediate school degree 0.519 2.36
Experience / 100    high school 0.301 0.84
Experience / 100    apprenticeship 0.356 1.61
Experience / 100    graduate 0.162 0.48
Job tenure / 100 0.135 6.21
Job tenure² /1000 -0.014 -3.04
Firm size
(Reference: 1-4 employees)
Firm size     5      19 0.134 3.16
Firm size   20    199 0.234 6.02
Firm size 200  1999   0.291 7.28
Firm size 2000   0.392 4.79
FTC -0.105 -2.48
F  tests of Joint Significance F p-Val
Industry dummies 14.17 0.000
Qualification 9.59 0.000
Experience 2.35 0.051
Firm size 20.66 0.000
R2 0.454
Number of Observations 1,914
Notes: 10 industry dummies are included in the wage equation but not reported.
The joint tests include all the interaction terms. Robust Standard Errors.
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel
Therefore, the wage equation (16) is re-estimated by the Heckman (1979) esti-
mator (full maximum-likelihood) taking into account the labour market participa-
tion. For the participation equation the same variables are used as in section 5. The
results are depicted in Table 4. Since the likelihood-ratio test does not reject the
null hypothesis of independence of the equations sample selection bias seems to
be no problem. The result of this test is in line with the finding that the estimated
coefficients are not altered in comparison with the OLS estimation. The results are
also compatible with other German studies which do not find evidence for sample
selection bias (Lauer / Steiner 2000). For this reason, labour market participation
is not considered in the following analyses.
19
Table 4: Wage effects of FTCs taking labour market participation into ac-
count
log wages Labour market participation
Coeff. t-stat Coeff.  t-stat.
Constant 2.753 20.12 Constant -6.383 -5.36
Women 0.011 0.21 Women 1.597 1.00
Qualification 
(Reference: No formal qualification
and low school degree)
Qualification 
(Reference: No formal qualifica-
tion and low school degree)
Intermediate school degree -0.091 -1.40 Intermediate school degree -0.190 -2.19
High School 0.095 1.00 High school -0.085 -0.60
Apprenticeship -0.042 -0.67 Apprenticeship -0.094 -0.89
Graduate 0.205 2.33 Graduate 0.786 4.81
Experience / 100 1.042 1.27 Intermediate school    women 0.010 2.64
Experience² / 100 -0.022 -1.70 High school   women 0.016 2.11
Experience / 100   women -0.603 -3.38 Apprenticeship   women 0.004 0.98
Experience / 100   interm. school 0.516 2.32 Graduate   women -0.019 -2.15
Experience / 100    high school 0.323 0.88 Attitude to work 
Experience / 100   apprenticeship 0.371 1.72 Work is very important 0.156 2.86
Experience / 100    graduate 0.201 0.58 Work is unimportant -0.842 -10.42
Job tenure / 100 0.135 6.47 Interest payments 0.349 3.28
Job tenure² /1000 -0.015 -3.04 Spouse employed 0.103 1.20
Firm Size Spouse employed   women 0.168 1.43
(Reference: 1-4 employees) # of children -0.022 -0.45
Firm size     5      19 0.135 4.32 # of children   women -0.349 -5.36
Firm size   20    199 0.234 8.54 Married 0.429 3.18
Firm size 200  1999   0.291 9.72 Married   women -0.930 -4.80
Firm size 2000   0.392 6.25 Divorced -0.274 -1.55
FTC -0.105 -2.87 Divorced   women 0.214 0.91
Age 0.350 6.76
Age2 -0.004 -7.78
Age   women -0.098 -1.37
Age2   women 0.001 1.65
LR  tests of Joint Significance χ2 p-Val LR  tests of Joint Significance χ2 p-Val
Industry dummies 144.72 0.000 Attitude to work 139.07 0.000
Qualification 330.04 0.000 # of children 72.26 0.000
Experience 9.17 0.057 Qualification 73.61 0.000
Firm Size 120.61 0.000 Age 224.84 0.000
Divorced 2.55 0.2796
Spouse Employed 12.53 0.0019
Number of uncensored observations: 1,914 Number of observations: 3,301
Log-Likelihood 2167.843
Wald test : χ2 (29) = 1,347.08 (p-value: 0.000) 
 = 0.03 (Std. Err.: 0.206)
LR test of independence of the equations (=0) : χ 2 (1) = 0.19 (p-value: 0.6650)
Notes: 10 industry dummies are included in the wage equation but not reported.
The joint tests include all interaction terms. The results are described in the text. 
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel
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6.3 Control function estimator
The contract type in equation (16) is now treated as endogenous. Therefore, the
control function estimator described in section 3.3 is applied. The estimation re-
sults are depicted in Table 5. 
Table 5: Wage effects of FTCs 
log wages FTC
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat.
Constant 2.747 21.42 Constant -2.050 -7.02
Women -0.013 -0.26 Dur. of previous unemployment 0.025 1.99
Dur. of previous employment -0.005 -3.72
Experience / 100 -0.62 -0.65
Qualification 
(reference: No formal qualification
and low school degree) Blue collar worker 0.443 2.91
Intermediate school degree -0.095 -1.46 Professionals 0.265 1.69
High school 0.097 1.04 Civil service 1.164 2.96
Apprenticeship -0.040 -0.64 (Experience /100)   civil service -3.547 -2.28
Graduate 0.217 2.53 (Experience /100)   women 0.101 0.20
Experience 0.012 1.65 New employer 1.163 6.87
Experience² / 100 -0.025 -2.20 Out of labour force before 0.703 2.70
Experience/100   women -0.600 -3.33
Experience/100  intermed. school 0.525 2.37 Firm size
Experience/100    high school 0.302 0.83 (Basis: 1-19 employees)
Experience/ 100    apprenticeship 0.359 1.67 Firm size   20    199 0.246 1.49
Experience / 100    graduate 0.168 0.49 Firm size 200  1999   0.448 2.52
Job tenure / 100 0.126 5.95 Firm size 2000   -0.205 -0.54
Job tenure2 / 1000 -0.013 -2.70
Firm size
(Basis: 1-4 employees)
Firm size     5      19 0.136 4.38
Firm size   20    199 0.237 8.62
Firm size 200  1999   0.297 9.85
Firm size 2000   0.399 6.33
FTC -0.247 -3.09
LR  tests of Joint Significance Χ2 P-val. LR  tests of Joint Significance Χ2 P-val.
Industry Dummies 144.02 0.000 Experience 9.77 0.021
Qualification 35.11 0.000 Firm Size 7.89 0.048
Experience 19.98 0.001
Firm size 123.13 0.000
Log-Likelihood 696.198 
Wald test : χ2 (29) = 1585.57 (p-value: 0.000) 
  = 0.248 (Std. Err.: 0.124), 

 =0.306 (Std. Err.: 0.005),  =0.076 (0.038)
LR test of independence of the equations (  =0) : χ2 (1) = 2.95 (p-value: 0.086)
Number of Observations: 1,914
Notes: The joint tests include all interaction terms. 10 industry dummies are included in the wage equation
but not reported. The results are described in the text.
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel
The first important finding is the result of the likelihood-ratio test which indi-
cates at the 10 percent level that the wage equation and the probit equation for
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FTCs are not independent and that the selection into FTCs should not be treated as
exogenous. Therefore, one can conlude that the estimated effects in the last sec-
tion are biased.   
The main finding is that FTCs reduce the hourly earnings of workers by about
21.9 percent, given their characteristics and the selection into FTCs.17 This large
amount seems to be fairly unrealistic and may be a result of specification errors as
well as the fact that job tenure could not be included into the selection equation.
6.4 Matching
Two different matching estimators are applied using the propensity score (re-
spectively the linear index) from the probit estimation presented in section 5 (Ta-
ble 2). First, nearest-neighbours matching with replacement (a given control unit
can be matched to more than one treated unit) but without oversampling (only one
neighbour is matched to one treated) is performed. Second, one-to-one caliper
matching with replacement is performed.18 
Nearest-neighbours matching uses all workers with FTCs (within the common
support) while the caliper matching drops FTC workers for which no control
worker is found within the maximum absolute distance given by the caliper.
Therefore, selection-bias is more probable to remain in the first case due to differ-
ences in the distribution of the Z variables over its common support. In the second
case some FTC workers are left out so that the sample is reduced and cannot be
compared with the other estimations. The caliper is set to  = 0.05, which is a
compromise between bad matches and the loss of units. 
The number of FTC workers for which all variables are available is not very
large with 90 observations (the corresponding number of permanent workers is
1826) in the sample. However, there are several evaluation studies for the German
active labour market policy using matching estimators with a comparable number. 
Matching Quality
Figure 1 shows the overlap of Z  of the sample of permanent workers and the
sample of FTC workers. Although the mass of the distribution of the controls is to
the left of the treated, there is an overlap for a large part of the distribution of the
persons with FTCs. However, there is a minor lack of overlap in the right tail of
the distribution. 
                                             
17 -21.9=[(exp(-0.290)-1)100].
18 I apply the matching estimators for STATA 7.0 implemented by Barbara Sianesi. 
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    Figure  1: Distribution of Z  for FTCs and Permanent Workers    
Note: Mean (standard  deviation) in treated / control sample is -1.18 (0.74) / -2.07 (0.50)
Table 6: Means and standardised differences of important variables (%)
Before matching After nearest- neigh-
bours matching
After one-to-one
caliper matching
FTC perm diff. % FTC perm diff. % FTC perm diff. %
Propensity score Z -1.19 -2.10 142.5 -1.19 -1.21 2.3 -1.29 -1.29 0.02
Job tenure 54.67 162.08 98.2 54.67 54.03 0.6 44.90 45.33 0.4
Dur. of prev. employment 43.59 93.07 86.7 43.59 44.65 1.8 39.17 38.60 1.0
Dur. of prev. unemployment 2.68 0.350 45.5 2.68 3.63 18.5 2.31 3.83 29.4
New employer 0.34 0.05 80.0 0.34 0.37 6.9 0.27 0.29 4.3
Out of labour force before 0.11 0.02 37.2 0.11 0.14 10.2 0.13 0.16 12.8
Civil service 0.34 0.30 9.8 0.34 0.24 21.7 0.30 0.19 23.8
Blue collar worker 0.42 0.33 17.2 0.42 0.37 10.4 0.44 0.40 9.8
Professionals 0.34 0.33 27.9 0.34 0.29 11.3 0.33 0.27 14.2
Experience 22.44 27.45 61.5 22.45 23.97 18.6 22.56 24.03 18.6
Experience   civil service 6.79 8.27 12.2 6.79 4.01 22.8 6.24 3.51 22.4
Experience   women 10.97 12.06 8.0 10.97 10.97 7.6 10.88 11.52 4.7
Women * 0.49 0.43 13.0 0.49 0.46 7.6 0.49 0.48 3.2
Years of schooling * 12.55 12.23 11.2 12.55 12.29 9.1 12.52 12.30 3.2
Notes: * Women and years of schooling (educational and vocational level) do not determine the
type of contract and are therefore not included in the propensity score. 
In order to increase the matching quality, additional variables are included so
that the propensity score is augmented to a balancing score (Rosenbaum / Rubin
1983). Besides the duration of the actual employment spell (job tenure) which
could not be included into the participation equation due to endogeneity, other
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variables which turn out to be important for selection are included. The inclusion
of job tenure secures that only persons with the same duration of their actual em-
ployment spell are compared. The duration of previous employment spells may
capture unobservables as well as signals for the employee. Furthermore it may be
a proxy for previous temporary contract jobs.
In Table 6 the means of characteristics Z of the workers with FTCs and the
workers with permanent contracts, as well as the matched FTCs and controls are
depicted. In addition the means of the propensity score (respectively the index)
and the standardised difference before and after matching is included. The stan-
dardised difference is defined as (Rosenbaum / Rubin 1985),
    
1 0
1 0 2
Z Z
V Z V Z


,
i.e. the absolute difference of the sample means in the treated 1Z  and non-treated
0Z  sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample
variances in the treated 1V  and non-treated 0V  groups. It can be seen that the stan-
dardised differences of most variables is reduced. Most important, the standard-
ised difference of Z  is reduced from 142.5 % to 2.3 % and 0.02%, respectively. 
The standardised difference should not be confused with the remaining selection
bias after the estimation. It should be kept in mind that matching on the propensity
score is sufficient for an unbiased estimation of the effect.19 
Wage Effects
The estimated wage effects from the matching estimators are depicted in Table
7. The first part of the table contains the results of the nearest-neighbours match-
ing. In the first row are the results of nearest-neighbours matching with the bal-
ancing score consisting only of the estimated propensity score. In this case the
average wage of the FTC workers is 23.3 DM and the average wage of the perma-
nent workers is 26.5 DM. This implies that the wage effect (the average treatment
effect) of FTCs  is -12.0 %, which is, however, not statistically significant at the
10 per cent level. Also after the inclusion of job tenure and the duration of the
previous employment spell, the wage effects are insignificant. 
The estimated effects of the caliper matching are smaller and also insignificant.
It can be seen in the last column that the number of matched pairs is reduced since
it is not always possible to find corresponding matches within the caliper.  
Assuming that the effects would become significant with a larger sample size it
is insightful to compare the effects. It can be seen in the results of both matching
                                             
19 Given that all relevant Z are included in the selection equation, there are no specification errors in the
probit, there is no further selection on unobservable variables and there is a sufficiently large overlap
between treatment and potential control group.
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estimators that the negative wage effect becomes smaller after the inclusion of job
tenure (in months). The preferred specification is one-to-one caliper matching
with the balancing score consisting of the propensity score, job tenure and the du-
ration of previous employment. In this case the effect of -5.2% is far from being
significant.  
Table 7: Estimation result of matching estimators
Nearest-neighbours matching
Balancing score average wage of t-stat
FTC perm.
Effect in
%
matched
pairs
Z 23.32 26.50 -12.0% -1.60 88 
Z , TEN 23.32 25.56 -8,6% -1.16 88 
Z , TEN, Durat. of prev. employment 23.32 25.03 -6,8% -0.98 88 
One-to-one caliper matching
Balancing score average wage of t-stat
FTC perm.
Effect in
%
matched
pairs
Z 23.61 26.64 -11.4% -1.54 86 
Z , TEN 23.51 25.33 -7.2% -0.94  84 
Z , TEN, Durat. of prev. employment 23.83 25.12 -5.2% -0.66 72 
 
The results are not altered significantly if instead of the duration of the previous
employment other variables are included in the balancing score, like dummies for
blue collar workers or civil servants or the duration of previous unemployment.
Also the inclusion of variables not included in the estimation of the propensity
score, like years of schooling does not alter these findings.
The difference between the matching estimators and the control function ap-
proach which yields a significant effect of -22 percent may be explained by the
assumptions concerning distribution and functional forms of the parametric
model. Furthermore, as already mentioned, the variable job tenure could not be
included in the estimation of the propensity score, respectively in the selection
equation in the control function estimator in section 6.3. 
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7 Conclusion
Although the sample size may be too small to obtain significant results with the
matching estimators one can conclude that there is no evidence for a compensat-
ing differential for FTC workers. Far from it, negative wage effects are found.
However, these negative effects of FTCs on wages are not too important. 
Assuming that there is a negative wage differential for FTCs, an interesting
question for further research is whether those workers are compensated in subse-
quent positions by higher wages.
FTCs may be an instrument to increase the reemployment probability of workers
with bad signals and unobserved characteristics. It is shown that FTC workers
have  given their observable characteristics like qualification, experience and
gender  longer previous unemployment spells and shorter employment spells
than permanent workers. However, the shorter employment spells may also be
interpreted as evidence for state dependence: workers with temporary jobs have a
higher probability of getting another temporary job than permanent workers. Es-
pecially in this area research is needed. 
 Another important finding is that matching estimators seem to be well-suited for
the analysis of wage differentials. Further research should apply extensions like
kernel-based matching. Also the longitudinal dimension of the GSOEP should be
used for matching combined with conditional difference-in-difference estimators
in order to take unobserved heterogeneity explicitly into account (see Heckman et
al. 1998).     
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Appendix
Table A1: Summary statistic for the labour market participation equation
mean. standard
deviation
min max
Participation* 0.604 0.489 0 1
Women* 0.550 0.498 0 1
Work is very important * 0.354 0.478 0 1
Work in unimportant * 0.124 0.329 0 1
Interest Payments * 0.067 0.250 0 1
Spouse employed * 0.576 0.494 0 1
# Children 0.689 1.027 0 9
Married * 0.800 0.400 0 1
Divorced * 0.098 0.298 0 1
Age 46.664 8.581 30 60
Intermediate School Degree * 0.362 0.481 0 1
High school * 0.167 0.373 0 1
Apprenticeship * 0.755 0.430 0 1
Graduate * 0.132 0.339 0 1
Notes: * Dummy Variables, Number of observation is 3,501.
Table A2: Summary statistic for the wage equation
mean standard
deviation
min max
Hourly wage 3.259 28.231 3.69 123.25
Intermediate school degree* 0.362 0.481 0 1
High school* 0.216 0.412 0 1
Apprenticeship* 0.753 0.431 0 1
Graduate * 0.182 0.386 0 1
Women * 0.432 0.495 0 1
Experience (years) 27.244 8.369 4.5 45
Job tenure (months) 157.651 123.154 1 547
New employer * 0.059 0.236 0 1
Out of labour force before * 0.024 0.152 0 1
Civil service * 0.299 0.458 0 1
Firm size 5  19 * 0.144 0.351 0 1
Firm size 20  199 * 0.500 0.500 0 1
Firm size 200  1999 * 0.261 0.439 0 1
Firm size 2000   * 0.016 0.124 0 1
FTC 0.041 0.199 0 1
Dur. of previous unemployment 0.425 2.854 0 51
Dur. of previous employment 91.112 67.793 0 202
Blue collar worker 0.339 0.473 0 1
Professional 0.222 0.416 0 1
Notes: * Dummy Variables, Number of observation is 1,914.
